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I. INTRODUCTION 
The fishing industry has been important to many nations of 
the world since mankind first sailed the ocean. The diets and 
economies of many nations are still inextricably linked to the sea. 
Prior to 1900, the international fishing fleets were guided only by 
the principle of "catch-as-catch-can." Demand seemed relatively light 
when contrasted with the seemingly endless supply, and fishing had 
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little effect on the international stock of fish. In addition, the gain 
to be realized by restricting access and extending jurisdictional 
claims over the ocean was slight in comparison to the costs of en-
forcing an exclusive access system.1 The development of new 
technology since 1900, however, has rendered ocean surveillance 
cost efficient,2 and larger populations and increased technical 
capabilities have caused a dramatic increase in the world demand 
for fish products resulting in tremendous pressure on the fisheries 
of the oceans. "It has been estimated that the worldwide harvest 
of these resources has increased fifteenfold" 3 since the beginning 
of the twentieth century. 
The world commercial catch of fish and other aquatic organisms 
has steadily increased in recent years and in 1981 amounted to 
7 4,760,000 metric tons! In 1976, it was estimated that six countries 
accounted for fifty percent of the world catch of fish-Japan (14.8 
percent), the U .S.S.R. (14.1 percent), China (6.4 percent), Peru (6.0 
percent), Norway (4.7 percent), and the United States (4.1 percent).5 
The commercial fishing industry of the United States increased its 
catch each year after 1977, and in 1981, the United States had gone 
from the sixth to the fourth largest fish producing nation in the 
world.6 Catches of the U.S. commercial fishing industry totaled 6.4 
billion pounds valued at $2.4 billion in 1982, representing an increase 
of seven percent in quantity over 1981.7 The economic value of the 
marine recreational fishing industry is also significant. 8 The total 
value of edible and nonedible fishery products imported by the 
United States is estimated at $4.5 billion, and this amount far ex-
ceeds the $1.1 billion value of U.S. domestic exports of these same 
products.9 
1. Prewo, Ocean Fishing: Economic Efficiency and the Law of the Sea, 15 TEX. INT'L 
L.J. 261, 262 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Prewo]. 
2. Id. 
3. Taft, The Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference: Major Unresolved Fisheries Issues, 
14 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 112, 112 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Taft]. 
4. This figure does not include marine mammals and aquatic plants. NAT'L OCEANIC 
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T. COMMERCE, FISHERIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1982 26 (1983) 
[hereinafter cited as FISHERIES 1982]. 
5. NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, FISHERY STATISTICS 
OF THE UNITED STATES 1976 40 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FISHERY STATISTICS 1976]. 
6. FISHERIES 1982, supra note 4, at· 26. 
7. Id. at iv. 
8. See Warner, Conservation Aspects of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
and the Protection of Critical Marine Habitat, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 97, 97 (1983)[hereinafter 
cited as Warner]; NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, MARINE 
RECREATIONAL FISHERY STATISTICS SURVEY, ATLANTIC AND GULF COASTS, 1979 (1980). 
9. FISHERIES 1982, supra note 4, at v. 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1984], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss1/3
1984] The Law of the Sea 11 
This increased demand upon ocean resources intensifies the 
need for regulation. Different catch limits for different species of 
fish are now recognized as necessary to rational fisheries manage-
ment. Achieving the goal of effective management has proved dif-
ficult for two reasons. First, most overexploited stocks inhabit in-
ternational waters where national regulation is ineffective. Second, 
no international authority exists to legislate and enforce rules to 
preserve fishery resources.10 
II. ANADROMOUS AND CATADROMOUS FISH STOCKS, 
SEDENTARY SPECIES, AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY 
SPECIES 
A. DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS 
One very basic impediment to rational fisheries management 
was the traditional and widespread belief that the high seas were 
common areas and that ocean resources were common property. 
While the term "common property" was frequently utilized, it was 
used de facto to mean res nullius (i.e., the property of nobody), and 
the general laymen's use of "common property" should not be con-
fused with the concept of the "common heritage of mankind" based 
on res communes (i.e., things common to all). Historically, farmers 
grazed their livestock on communal fields and common pastures, 
particularly in common law countries. The frequent result was 
overgrazing.11 Given a limited resource and no system of allocation 
but "first-come-first-served," the ultimate result was destruction 
of the resource and the industries dependent on it. Under such a 
system, it can be postulated that each seafaring nation will seek 
to harvest all the fish it can, knowing that another country will do 
so if it does not. No country will attempt to conserve fish stocks 
because what it can preserve, another will take. This problem has 
been called the "tragedy of the commons."12 When applied to the 
fisheries scenario, the result has been overfishing and depleted 
stocks.13 As human populations increased, most common law coun-
tries abandoned the "commons" concept with regard to food gather-
ing, pasturing, and hunting and fishing areas; however, the com-
10. Copes, The Law of the Sea and Management of Anadromous Fish Stocks, 4 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT'L L.J. 233, 233-34 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Copes]. 
11. Id. at 248-49. 
12. See Alverson, Management of the Ocean's Living Resources: An Essay Review, 3 
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 99, 111 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Alverson]; Hardin, The Tragedy 
of the Commons, in ENVTL. HANDBOOK (G. DeBell ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Hardin]. 
13. Alverson, supra note 12, at 111. 
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munal approach has not been fully abandoned internationally.14 
Fisheries management presents certain problems not evident 
in other conservation activities. First, fish cannot easily be confined 
to particular areas. They move - often between areas of national 
control and the high seas (anadromous and catadromous species) 
or between widely separated areas of the high seas (highly 
migratory species). Second, fish are both a perishable and a 
replenishable resource. Since fisheries are such an important food 
source, they cannot and should not be absolutely protected, but they 
should not be depleted beyond their capacity to replenish 
themselves. Determining the optimum annual harvest of any species, 
however, presents extraordinary technical difficulties.15 
The difficulties of fisheries management are illustrated by 
Canada's efforts to conserve its stocks of Pacific and Atlantic 
salmon. Salmon is an anadromous species, that is, one which: (1) 
spawns in fresh waters; (2) spends most of its life cycle in the ocean 
where the fish mature; and (3) returns to the rivers and streams 
of its origin to renew the cycle.16 Protection and enhancement of 
salmon stocks during the freshwater phase of the life cycle are 
extremely important to achieve maximum returns from the salmon 
resource. The country of origin must ensure that pollution in salmon 
rivers is held to a minimum. Obstructions to the salmon run, such 
as landslides, dams, and other obstacles, must either be removed 
or overcome. Habitat improvement, as well as the operation of 
spawning channels and hatcheries, may add greatly to the build-
up of salmon stocks. Of course, these improvements require substan-
tial government expenditures. 
It has also been demonstrated that salmon eggs can be in-
troduced into a lake to which salmon are not indigenous, that the 
eggs will hatch, and that the salmon will return to that lake to 
spawn. This ability to move salmon to new areas is heartening to 
environmentalists, but it should not be considered to be a panacea 
for manmade water projects which interfere with the indigenous 
salmon run. Salmon must be protected in their natural habitats. 
Inevitably, the use of a river for salmon production competes 
with other uses, such as, power generation, flood control, industrial 
14. Hardin, supra note 12, at 48. 
15. Kronfol, The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Critique of Contemporary Law of the Sea, 
9 J. MAR. L. & COM. 461, 465-66 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Kronfol]. 
16. Taft, supra note 3, at 114-15. 
4
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1984], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss1/3
1984) The Law of the Sea 13 
waste disposal, irrigation, and navigation. An economically rational 
choice between competing uses will be made by a country only if 
it incurs the full cost and benefit of the choice.17 Even so, a large 
proportion of salmon originating in Canadian and U.S. rivers is 
caught by nations which did not contribute to the Canadian or U.S. 
salmon program. 
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) attempted to solve some of these problems. For 
example, the Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention)18 
negotiated at UNCLOS III, creates an exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ),19 in which coastal states are entitled to exercise "sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources,"20 including the fish stocks. Under 
this "functional jurisdiction," first proposed by Canada and the 
United States, the coastal state may not exercise authority over 
maritime activities concerned with the internationally lawful uses 
of the sea which are related to navigation and communication21 in 
the expanse of water outside its own narrow territorial sea. 
The proposed regime, as promulgated in the early negotiations 
in 1976, specifically allowed coastal states to implement rational 
fishery management plans for all fish stocks specific to their 
economic zones. 
Coastal states' rights and responsibilities include the right to deter-
mine the allowable catch of the living resources in the zone for 
the purpose of achieving the "maximum sustainable yield" of the 
fisheries population [Article 61]. The coastal state is also given the 
right to determine the objective of the "optimum utilization of the 
living resources in the exclusive economic zone." Where the coastal 
state does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable 
catch, it must through agreements and other arrangement and pur-
suant to a wide variety of factors, give other states access to the 
surplus of the allowable catch [Article 62].22 
17. See Copes, supra note 10, at 242, 244. 
18. Done Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in 21 1.L.M. 1261, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982) 
[hereinafter cited as LOS Convention]. 
19. Id. arts. 55-75. As the rights of the coastal state in its economic zone are not 
exclusive, the exclusive economic zone is more properly referred to as just the "economic 
zone." 
20. Id art. 56, para. l(a). 
21. Id art. 58, para. 1; see Copes, supra note 10, at 235. 
22. Kronfol, supra note 15, at 464; see LOS Convention, supra note 18, arts. 61-62. 
5
Kindt: The Law of the Sea: Anadromous and Catadromous Fish Stocks, Seden
Published by SURFACE, 1984
14 Syr. J. lnt'l L. & Corn. [Vol. 11:9 
Although the concept of "maximum sustainable yield"23 (MSY) has 
been modified somewhat, these rights and responsibilities are 
preserved in the LOS Convention. As most fish are caught within 
200 miles of land, adoption of the EEZ concept has caused and will 
continue to cause political and economic problems for the distant-
water fishing nations. 
Some of these problems have already occurred in the United 
States. Concern with the depletion of fish stocks near U.S. shores 
led Congress to enact the Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act of 1976 (FCMA or MFCMA)24 creating a 200-mile exclusive 
fisheries zone around American coasts. Between the enactment of 
FCMA and March 1977, Russian trawlers were cited for fifty-three 
violations, and the situation became even more serious in April 1977, 
when the Coast Guard seized a Russian trawler.25 Although the crisis 
was resolved peacefully in this case, the potential for a dangerous 
showdown is clear. 
The LOS Convention does not provide a satisfactory solution 
to the problem. Faced with the argument that stronger language 
would abridge the sovereign rights of coastal states over fish in 
their EEZ's, the negotiators settled on an article which calls merely 
for cooperation among involved countries to provide for adequate 
management.26 The article is merely hortatory, and neither sanc-
tions nor enforcement procedures are provided to deter un-
cooperative countries.27 
The chance of establishing bilateral agreements between coun-
tries interested in fishery resources within a given EEZ may be 
quite high. The United States has successfully utilized this bilateral 
agreement approach and should continue to do so in the future. With 
regard to those areas of the high seas and to those species that 
do not remain within the EEZ, however, there may be several in-
terested countries, and agreement becomes more difficult.28 Prob-
lems with initial catch quotas and future adjustments to quotas may 
prove to be insurmountable, and differing opinions concerning op-
timal management guidelines or acceptable fishing methods may 
23. For a good discussion of "maximum sustainable yield," see H. KNIGHT, THE LAW 
OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS 659-62 (1976) [hereinafter cited as LOS CASES]. 
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1801-1882 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
25. See A Littl,e Stink About a Lot of Fish, TIME, Apr. 25, 1977, at 46. 
26. See LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 63. 
27. See Copes, supra note 10, at 235. 
28. Id. at 236. 
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be difficult to reconcile. Even if countries can surmount the initial 
stages of a particular fishery negotiation, the agreement could 
founder under pressures from outside countries not party to the 
agreement. These countries may make unacceptable quota demands 
or simply ignore the regulations. Countries which were originally 
adherents to the fisheries regime may then feel entitled or com-
pelled to increase their catch to make up for the fish taken by 
interlopers.29 
The North American salmon situation provides an illustration. 
Canadian and U.S. investment averaged $8.99 million between the 
years 1969 and 197 4.30 The gross value of Canada's east coast salmon 
catch, however, averaged only $2.75 million over the same period.31 
The salmon stocks off Greenland, where salmon regularly migrate 
to feed, increased benefiting from American and Canadian 
management.32 While the United States and Canada suffered a loss 
on their investments, Greenland fishermen realized a profit.33 The 
inevitable result of such an inequitable arrangement will probably 
be the discontinuation of conservation efforts. 
The LOS Convention formally acknowledges the primary right 
of the country of origin to its anadromous and coastal stocks.34 The 
logic of placing the management and harvest of anadromous stocks 
under the regulation of the coastal states where such stocks 
originate is implicitly recognized by all the nations which par-
ticipated in UNCLOS III. Even so, there are several "escape 
clauses" incorporated into the LOS Convention which allow for the 
circumvention of this principle. For example, high seas fishing for 
anadromous species is permitted if the "non-states of origin" can 
show that they would suffer "economic dislocation" without such 
fishing. 35 Even such developed nations as Japan could make such 
a claim. About fifty percent of Japan's annual catch of eleven million 
tons is taken from foreign seas.36 After the United States and the 
U .S.S.R. implemented their 200-mile fishery zones, the $7 .2 billion 
Japanese fishing industry had approximately 5,500 fishing and pro-
29. Id. at 235-36. 




34. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 66. 
35. Id. 
36. JAPAN: Pinched Between 200-Mi"le Limits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 28, 1977, 
at 70. 
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cessing boats idled, and Japanese cannery traffic slowed 
significantly. 37 
The LOS Convention requires the respective countries of origin 
to cooperate in mitigating this economic impact, but non-states of 
origin have no reciprocal obligation to minimize losses to states of 
origin in their management of stocks.38 The country of origin is re-
quired to set up conservation programs to govern the use of its 
coastal and anadromous stocks, yet non-states are not obligated to 
follow the maximum-catch rule.39 Therefore, due to noncompliance 
by non-states of origin, the only way for the state of origin to 
stabilize the catch at the maximum sustainable yield is to limit the 
catch of its own nationals.40 The result is a constructive subsidy 
for foreign fleets. 
In 1970, a "Declaration of Principles" by the U.N. General 
Assembly stated that the seabed beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, together with its resources, constituted the "common 
heritage of mankind."41 The EEZ concept, however, does little to 
promote equitable distribution of the resources of the "common 
heritage." Under this concept, the developed nations have received 
a disproportionately large share of ocean fisheries, and thus have 
derived the greatest benefit from such a regime. For example, seven 
nations (the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Por-
tugal, and the U.S.S.R.) control twenty-four percent of the area in-
cluded within economic zones.42 
The rights of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged 
states (LL/GDS) must also be considered. Under existing interna-
tional law, the LL/GDS may fish in the high seas, but the transfor-
mation of these fishing grounds into exclusive zones has seriously 
hurt, if not totally eliminated, the fishing conducted by the 
LL/GDS.43 
The LOS Convention provides for sharing of fishery resources 
37. Fishing to get around the 200-mi. limit, Bus. WEEK, May 9, 1977, at 36. 
38. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 66, para. 3(b); Copes, supra note 10, at 246. 
39. See Copes, supra note 10, at 246. 
40. Id. at 246. 
41. Declaration of Principles on the Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdic-
tion, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); see Note, 
A "Common Heritage" Approach to Fisheries Through Regional Controls, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L 
L. & POL. 171, 171 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Regional Approach]. 
42. Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 183. 
43. See J ayakumar, The Issue of the Rights of Lanlocked and Geographically Disadvan-
taged States in the Living Resources of the Economic Zone, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 69, 72 (1977). 
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with the landlocked states,44 but the duty could be unduly burden-
some for the parties to a sharing agreement. For example, Tanzania, 
a coastal state, has five landlocked neighbors, while Uganda, a 
landlocked state, is surrounded by four coastal states.45 Sharing of 
resources with geographically disadvantaged states is also provided. 
Zaire, with a surface area of nearly one million square miles but 
with a minimal shoreline, is accorded a zone of only twelve nautical 
miles.46 
From a global perspective, the EEZ concept is not the answer 
to rational fishery management: 
The spatial concept of jurisdiction, that is, selecting a given area 
over which control is to be exercised, does not take into account 
the distribution and structure of the fisheries resource, and is 
therefore unlikely to bring the entire resource under the control 
of a single state or entity. Conservation measures enacted with 
respect to that portion of the fishery stock within any individual 
state's exclusive area necessarily will be piecemeal vis-a-vis the 
entire resource. The irrationality of attempting to manage an area 
in which the fish may be found, rather than managing the fish 
themselves, has already been recognized in various provisions of 
current statutes and pending treaties concerning highly migratory 
species.47 
An example of the global nature of fisheries problems is the possi-
ble economic impact of climatic change on world fisheries. Human 
activity, in particular the effects of carbon dioxide accumulation 
due to the combustion of carbon-based fuels, could cause higher air 
temperatures, disturb the strength and direction of ocean currents, 
and increase the average salinity and temperature of surface sea 
water.48 Fluctuations in these variables may affect, inter alia, 
"spawning, migration, growth rates, food supplies, and predator-
prey relationships."49 
There are numerous instances which demonstrate the sensiti-
vity of marine fisheries to climatic change. The most dramatic is 
probably the collapse of the Peruvian anchovy industry during 1972 
44. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 69. 
45. Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 184. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 191. 
48. Frye, Climatic Change and Fisheries Management, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 77, 77, 85 
(1983). 
49. Id. at 88. 
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(from a catch of twelve million metric tons to two million tons) 
following the appearance of a warm current called "El Nino" which 
dipped farther south than usual into Peruvian waters. 50 While the 
degree to which El Nino affected the anchovies may have been 
great, it was still speculative. El Nino merely added the "last straw" 
to an "environmental threshold" that was already waiting to col-
lapse due to previous overexploitation of the anchovies and poor 
fisheries management by Peru. This situation also illustrates that 
even when there is good fisheries management, a fisheries catch 
level based on the principle of "maximum sustainable yield" may 
not be enough. To allow for unexpected environmental changes such 
as El Nino, an "environmental cushion" needs to be added to the 
fish stocks maintained under the concept of maximum sustainable 
yield. 
Another dramatic example of the sensitivity of fisheries to 
climatic change occurred during a warming trend between 1900 and 
1940, when yields in the cod fishery of West Greenland increased 
from zero to 70,000 tons.51 The cod fishery collapsed due to an overall 
cooling trend after 1940, which modified climatic patterns, including 
currents, winds, and temperature. 
Due to slow mixing which occurs between the surface and in-
termediate ocean waters, the full climatic effects resulting from any 
given concentration of carbon dioxide might not be evident for 
years.52 Such a lengthy lag time makes climatic change essentially 
irreversible, and this situation suggests that a remedial policy may 
have to be formulated, implemented, and maintained for decades 
without the benefit of supporting data or feedback.53 Fisheries prob-
lems of such great magnitude can only be adequately managed by 
international agreement. 
B. GOALS 
A single international fishery objective is difficult to formulate 
because fishing nations are economically, technologically, 
biologically, socially, and politically diverse. For example, large 
fishing companies dispatch modern fleets to distant-water fishing 
grounds to compete with fishermen in many countries who use 
50. Id. at 89. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 95. 
53. Id. 
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fishing techniques similar to those used hundreds of years ago.54 
Despite the vast differences among nations, it has been generally 
stated that: 
The main purpose of international fisheries law is to facilitate 
international fisheries practice with a minimum of international 
friction. This does not mean that there be no disputes, but rather 
that disputes be solved quickly and effectively. The major impedi-
ment to solution of international fishing disputes is the injection 
of notions of sovereignty, national prestige, and ideology into what 
is by nature an economic and pragmatic concern. Issues of military 
security, naval manoeuvres, overflight, and a host of nonfishery 
concerns complicate the solution of international fishery problems, 
especially those that are a manifestation of coastal state/distant 
water fishing state conflict. 55 
The American Society of International Law (ASIL) has 
delineated eight principles which should form the basis of an op-
timum global fisheries management policy. These principles state 
that: (1) there should be an objective of establishing jurisdictional 
bases for fisheries management entities; (2) the management enti-
ty should have the exclusive right to dispose of resources; (3) a global 
fisheries monitoring agency should be established; (4) management 
entities should be granted flexibility in management where systems 
are not inconsistent with global standards; (5) the goal of the 
management regime would be the maximization of opportunities 
for that country; (6) there should be provisions for dispute settle-
ment and avoidance; (7) actions inconsistent with any global fisheries 
treaty should be curtailed; and (8) enforcement authority should be 
given to the entity having jurisdiction.56 Many of these goals in-
fluenced the provisions in the LOS Convention, and the LOS Con-
vention can be interpreted not only to support these goals, but also 
to provide opportunities for giving effect to these principles - within 
the general international framework delimited in the LOS 
Convention. 
U.S. ocean policy has several goals: security; management 
(avoidance, reduction, and settlement) of conflict; promotion of ef-
54. THE LA w OF THE SEAS: NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 95 (L. Alex-
ander ed. 1972) (Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea In-
stitute, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode Island, June 26-29, 1972). 
55. Ottenheimer, Patterns of Development in International Fishery Law, 1973 CANA-
DIAN Y .B. INT'L L. 37, 38. 
56. AM. Soc·y lNT'L L., Principles for a Global Fisheries Management Regime 1-20 (1974). 
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ficiency and fair access in ocean use; protection of the environment; 
and promotion of ocean research. In addition, there is an overall 
goal of "maintaining a favorable legal order."57 These goals overlap 
and interface with the eight principles enumerated by the ASIL. 
It has already been noted that equitable allocation of fishery 
resources contributes to the goal of conflict management. Fairness 
and equity in the allocation of resources may also include promoting 
full utilization of resources to meet world needs, ensuring fair ac-
cess to common resources, and stabilizing expectations with regard 
to exclusive resources. Protection of the environment obviously in-
cludes conservation of living resources. 
These goals are best achieved within the context of a legal 
order where: (1) coastal states exercise control over coastal fish 
stocks subject to effective conservation and environmental 
safeguards and subject to the requirements of full utilization; (2) 
the state of origin exercises the primary responsibility for manage-
ment of its anadromous stocks subject to conditions ensuring ef-
fective conservation and full utilization; (3) highly migratory stocks 
(e.g., tuna) are managed on a regional basis with assurances of fair 
access; (4) cetaceans (e.g. whales and dolphins) are managed on a 
global basis by an International Cetacean Commission (a successor 
organization to the International Whaling Commission) to ensure 
conservation both within and beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion; and (5) sedentary species are managed by coastal states with 
the jurisdictional limit being the 200-mile limit of the EEZ or the 
edge of the continental margin whichever is farther seaward.58 
The LOS Convention provides for management of anadromous 
species by the country of origin in article 66 which provides "States 
in whose rivers anadromous stocks originate shall have the primary 
interest in and responsibility for such stocks."59 The FCMA claims 
jurisdiction over those species of fish which "spawn" in the fresh 
waters or in the estuarine waters of the United States and which 
migrate thence to the ocean. The FCMA seems to assert the same 
control over these species as is provided for in article 66, since in 
all likelihood the term "spawn" is synonymous with the term 
57. See Moore, A Foreign Policy For The Oceans, in THE OCEANS AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY 1, 2-4 (Center for Oceans Law & Policy, Apr. 1978). 
58. Id. at 4. The edge of the continental margin should be delimited pursuant to a 
Hedberg-type formula. See Hedberg, A Critique of Boundary Provisions in the Law of the 
Sea Treaty, 12 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 337 (1983). 
59. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art 66, para. 1. 
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"originate."60 Nonetheless, "[i]f 'originate' means that jurisdiction 
over salmon is conferred upon the state from whose waters the fish 
enter the ocean rather than upon the state in whose waters they 
spawn, then the United States is exercising less authority in some 
instances than the ... treaty provides."61 It has been suggested 
that because of the economic investment required of coastal states 
to preserve anadromous species at harvestable levels, the catching 
of these species on the high seas should be banned and that the 
harvest be limited to territorial waters during the return of these 
fish to their spawning grounds.62 This approach, however, .is 
politically unacceptable, at least without a form of economic "payoff' 
for nonaccess.63 Although coastal state regulation is the only effec-
tive means of protecting the inland spawning grounds of 
anadromous species, an international treaty is needed to halt the 
depletion of salmon that has resulted from the utilization of drift-
netting techniques. 
The LOS Convention does not go far enough in promoting these 
goals. With regard to the management of highly migratory stocks, 
it does not require coastal states which have these stocks within 
their 200-mile zones to join regional organizations, and therefore, 
coastal states may try to impose onerous restrictions on the taking 
of highly migratory species. Indeed, the prevailing view is that 
despite article 64 of the LOS Convention, these species are treated 
no differently than other living resources within the coastal zone.64 
Article 64 of the LOS Convention, which governs highly migratory 
species, should require membership in regional organizations for 
these coastal states.65 
Possibly the most commercially important highly migratory 
species is tuna, which is exempt from the fishery management 
authority of the United States under the FCMA.66 Under the ma-
jority view of the LOS Convention, the United States would be 
authorized to manage tuna within its 200-mile zone, but the United 
States may refuse to exercise this authority and continue to follow 
60. See Burke, U.S. Fishery Management And The New Law Of The Sea, 76 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 24, 45 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Burke]. 
61. Id. 
62. LOS CASES, supra note 23, at 676. 
63. Id. 
64. Burke, supra note 60, at 41. 
65. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 64. 
66. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1813 & 1802(14) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
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a policy of regulating tuna fishing by international agreement.67 The 
purpose in not asserting jurisdiction over tuna within U.S. coastal 
waters is to allow continued access of U.S. distant-water tuna 
vessels to the coastal waters of other nations which might other-
wise assert jurisdiction over tuna within their 200-mile zones.68 
Nonetheless, other countries have rejected U.S. claims that tuna 
are not subject to coastal state regulation. Throughout the era of 
UNCLOS III, the United States was one of a minority of countries 
which did not claim jurisdiction over tuna.69 As a result, the bluefin 
tuna was heavily fished along the U.S. coast, and its numbers were 
seriously depleted.70 In the future, the need to protect this species 
from over-fishing might preclude the United States from maintain-
ing its policy of excluding tuna from its jurisdiction.71 
This minority policy promulgated by the United States has pro-
voked controversies with Canada, Mexico, and other nations relating 
to access to tuna.72 These controversies peaked in 1979, when 
Canada, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Peru seized United States tuna 
boats fishing within their 200-mile zones.73 The United States 
retaliated by placing embargoes on Costa Rican, Peruvian, and Cana-
dian tuna and related tuna products.74 Although much of the con-
troversy surrounding U.S. fishing rights to tuna and other species 
has been resolved,75 these conflicts demonstrated the need to replace 
the discredited Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission.76 
There is growing support for regulation of wide ranging 
species, such as, tuna and whales, on an international basis since 
these species have only minimal contact with the 200-mile zones 
of coastal states.77 Accordingly, article 64 of the LOS Convention 
67. Burke, supra note 60, at 43. 
68. Id. 
69. Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Stocks: Hearing Before the National Ocean Policy Study of 
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1982). 
70. Id. at 1. 
71. Id. 
72. See Note, The Tuna War: Fishery Jurisdiction In International Law, 1981 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 755, 764-65, 767-68. 
73. Note, Recent Develo]J1nents In The Law Of The Sea 1978-1979, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
691, 719 (1980) [hereinafter cited as LOS 1978-1979]. 
74. Id. at 720. 
75. Id. See generally Rhee, The Application of Equitable Principles to Resolve the United 
States-Canada Dispute Over East Coast Fishery Resources, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 667 (1980); 
Donaldson & Pontecorvo, Economic Rationalization of Fisheries: The Problem of Conflicting 
National Interests on Georges Bank, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 149 (1980). 
76. LOS 1978-1979, supra note 73, at 720. 
77. LOS CASES, supra note 23, at 676. 
14
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1984], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol11/iss1/3
1984] The Law of the Sea 23 
should have provided that nonmembers of the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) or its successor organization must adopt conser-
vation measures in their economic zones which are "no less effective 
than international standards."78 It was unfortunate that this sug-
gestion was not incorporated into article 64. 
Sedentary species are generally defined as "organisms which, 
at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-
bed_ or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with 
the sea-bed or the subsoil."79 Most disputes concerning sedentary 
species involve various species of lobster and whether these are 
included within this definition.80 Article 77 of the LOS Convention 
grants coastal states the right to exploit natural resources including 
sedentary species contained within the continental shelf, 81 yet ar-
ticle 68 specifically exempts sedentary species from the EEZ restric-
tions imposed in part V.82 Since the LOS Convention imposes no 
obligations regarding yields or surplus, the FCMA recognizes 
greater foreign rights to these living resources than is required 
under the LOS Convention, and this results from subjecting seden-
tary species to the same FCMA management requirements as any 
other species. 83 
The ultimate goal of conservation is the maximization of food 
production of the oceans. The LOS Convention calls for production 
up to the "maximum sustainable yield."84 The calculation of max-
imum sustainable yield, however, is a complicated exercise requir-
ing a large amount of information about fish stocks, including 
migratory patterns and breeding habits,85 which may not be 
available when such determinations become economically or 
politically necessary. 
Despite the possible void of information, the attractiveness of 
the concept of MSY is: (1) its focus on maximization of fish produc-
tion; (2) the definability and simplicity of the concept itself; and (3) 
the availability of scientific tools that can at least reasonably ap-
proximate this value.86 The primary objection to this highly quan-
78. See LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 64. 
79. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 77, para. 4. 
80. LOS CASES, supra note 23, at 677. 
81. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 77. 
82. Id. art. 68. 
83. Burke, supra note 60, at 47. 
84. See LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 61, para. 3. 
85. Kronfol, supra note 15, at 465-66. 
86. Burke, supra note 60, at 25. 
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tifiable value is that the biological objectives of MSY do not ade-
quately incorporate the socio-economic concerns of fishery 
management.87 Fishery economists have long noted that "manage-
ment based on a biological objective such as MSY will inevitably 
result in over-capacity in the fishery and the dissipation of the poten-
tial economic benefits which might be achieved if 'optimization' in-
volved socio-economic objectives with biological constraints."88 For 
example, the use of MSY as a fishery management goal will result 
in a failure to weigh the opportunity costs to society of utilizing 
its limited resources to catch fish.89 In any event, the objective con-
cept of MSY is preferable to the most general concept of "optimum 
yield" (OY), which allows nations more latitude in determining 
harvestable levels.90 Mechanisms for gathering information and stan-
dards for determining permissible catch must be developed. 
The problems of landlocked and geographically disadvantag-
ed states must also be addressed. The traditional principle of mare 
liberum guarantees all countries equal access to fisheries beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction. The guarantee, however, does 
not promote maritime activities by the LL/GDS. The comprehen-
sive law of the sea should allow these countries a more effective 
share in the common heritage.91 
Finalization of the LOS Convention was an important step 
toward resolving international fisheries problems, because the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in the Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion Case that in lieu of a LOS Treaty which was in force, proposals 
arising out of UNCLOS III were to be considered as only the opin-
ions of individual countries.92 For even a binding agreement to ef-
fectively solve fisheries problems, procedures are required to avoid 
and arbitrate disputes and to enforce substantive provisions. 
C. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Fishery management and conservation are relatively new prob-
lems. Before 1900, fishery resources seemed unlimited, and fishing 
nations generally exploited resources as their capabilities and need 
87. Id. 
88. Id. See generally Morey, Fishery Economics: An Introduction And Review, 20 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 827, 830-41 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Morey]. 
89. Morey, supra note 88, at 840-41. 
90. See Burke, supra note 60, at 28-29. 
91. See Alverson, supra note 12, at 112. 
92. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3. 
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dictated. When the possibility of overfishing became apparent early 
in this century, coastal states were without effective and comprehen-
sive means to meet the problem. An initial concern was the com-
petition for resources between contiguous nations and the impact 
of the fishing fleets of distant nations.93 One result was that a 
number of unilateral claims were made to extend jurisdiction over 
coastal waters. 
Only thirty years ago, the three-mile territorial sea was stan-
dard, but since 1982 (at the latest), a twelve-mile limit has been 
almost universally accepted.94 One of the first important claims to 
extended ocean resource jurisdiction was asserted in the Truman 
Proclamations of 1945,95 whereby the United States claimed jurisdic-
tion over fisheries and other resources in waters contiguous to the 
coast of the United States. As a result of this action, the policy of 
unilaterally claiming sovereignty over offshore resources became 
a trend in international policy.96 Unilateral extensions of coastal 
state jurisdiction first became prevalent in South America.97 In 1947, 
Chile claimed a 200-mile resource zone in an attempt to protect its 
whaling industry.98 In the same year, Peru declared 200-mile jurisdic-
tion in an attempt to protect its anchovies.99 In 1952, several South 
American States joined in the Santiago Declaration, the first 
multilateral agreement proclaiming exclusive jurisdiction for par-
ticular purposes.100 The concept of a 200-mile zone was rejected at 
the Second U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) 
93. Comment, Fishery And Economic Zones As Customary International Law, 17 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 661, 664 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Fishery Zones]. 
94. See LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 3; Copes, supra note 10, at 234. 
95. For a reprint of the Truman Proclamations, see Poli,cy of the United States With 
Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf, Pres. Proc. 
No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48 Compilation), and Policy of the United States With Respect to 
Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, Pres. Proc. No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-48 
Compilation). See also Fishery Zones, supra note 90, at 664; Jones, Freedom Of Fishing In 
Decline: The Fishery Conservation And Management Act Of 1976 And The Implications For 
Japan, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 52, 67 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Fishing Decline]. 
96. Fishery Zones, supra note 93, at 664. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 664-65. 
99. Id. at 665. 
100. Agreements between Chile, Ecuador and Peru, signed at the First Conference on 
the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the South Pacific, Santiago, 
18 August 1952, Declaration on the Maritime Zone, U.N. Doc. ST!LEG/SER.B/6, at 723-24 
(1957) and U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/10/Rev.l, at 9-10 (1968). See Mirvahabi, Significant Fishery 
Management Issues in the Law of the Sea Conference: Illusions and Realities, 15 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 493, 496-97 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mirvahabi]. 
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in 1958. The countries at UNCLOS II also failed to reach agree-
ment on the permissible extent of the territorial sea, although they 
did define all maritime area beyond the territorial sea to be high 
seas outside the control of any single nation.101 
Coastal states have justified unilateral extensions of maritime 
jurisdiction by claiming the need for authoritative regulation to 
achieve rational management and conservation and for protection 
of vital national interests.102 The ICJ gave support to these claims 
in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case.103 The Court recognized that a 
coastal state dependent on its coastal fisheries has preferential 
rights to coastal stocks paramount to the interests of other coun-
tries who wish to exploit the same resources. 104 
Even so, assertions of full 200-mile "economic zones" were few 
until the enactment of the FCMA. When the United States 
unilaterally declared a 200-mile "fishery jurisdiction" via the FCMA, 
the number of 200-mile claims mushroomed, and thereafter, it ap-
peared that such limits would attain universal acceptance. All of 
the major North American countries have now established such a 
zone as have the European Common Market countries, Iceland, Nor-
way, and the U.S.S.R.105 By 1977, thirty-six countries had claimed 
some form of 200-mile zone,106 and more than a hundred delegates 
to the first UNCLOS III session in Caracas supported this 
development.107 The debate continues, however, over the rights and 
duties of the coastal state within this area.108 The potential impact 
on fisheries of claims to 200-mile zones is clear. If all coastal states 
claimed 200-mile zones, the area enclosed would account for ninety-
four percent of the world's fish catch.109 
Approximately one-fifth of the world's fishery resources are 
located within 200 miles of the U.S. coastline.110 The FCMA grants 
the United States exclusive control of virtually all of the living 
marine resources within this zone, 111 an area encompassing almost 
101. See Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 175. 
102. See Copes, supra note 10, at 234. 
103. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3. 
104. Id. at 26. 
105. Copes, supra note 10, at 234-35. 
106. Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 17 4. 
107. Mirvahabi, supra note 100, at 497. 
108. Id. at 497-98. 
109. Fishing Decline, supra note 95, at 73-74. 
110. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ESTABLISHING A 200-MILE FISHERIES ZONE, 3 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as 200-MILE ZONE). 
111. Warner, supra note 8, at 97. 
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2,250,000 square miles of ocean space.112 The purpose of the FCMA 
is to establish a fishery conservation zone, which is adjacent to the 
coast of the United States in order to effectively manage and con-
serve fishery resources.113 In passing the FCMA, Congress noted 
that certain stocks of fish off the coasts of the United States had 
"been overfished to the point where their survival is threatened 
and other such stocks have been so substantially reduced in number 
that they could become similarly threatened."114 The FCMA pur-
ports to strike a balance between exploitation and conservation of 
fisheries resources; however, the language of the Act weighs heavily 
in favor of conservation.115 The FCMA authorizes eight regional 
fishery management councils which are responsible for developing 
fishery management plans.116 These management plans, among other 
things, identify the optimum yield which can be harvested annually 
in each fishery, and they determine the allowable level of foreign 
fishing. 117 Under the FCMA, the OY is determined by first 
establishing the MSY.118 
MSY is the biological determination of the number of "surplus" 
fish that can be caught without overfishing the stock in question. 
It is, in essence, the surplus production of the fishery; the safe up-
per limit of harvest which can be taken consistently year after year 
without diminishing the stock so that the stock is truly inexhausti-
ble and perpetually renewable.119 
The MSY is then modified by relevant ecological, economic, and 
social factors to arrive at OY.120 The Secretary of Commerce is 
delegated the responsibility of reviewing and approving each of the 
plans submitted by the councils, and the Secretary of State is 
responsible for allocating any surplus fisheries harvest among the 
various foreign nations.121 
112. 200-MILE ZONE, supra note 110, at 24. 
113. Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1979) [hereinafter cited as FCMA Hearings]. 
114. 200-MILE ZONE, supra note 110, at 4. 
115. Warner, Finamore, & Bean, Practical Application Of The Conservation Aspects Of 
The Fishery Conservation And Management Act, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 30, 49 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as Finamore]. 
116. Id. at 33; see FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 171. 
117. See FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 171. 
118. Finamore, supra note 115, at 39-40. 
119. Id. at 39. 
120. Id. at 41. 
121. FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 171; Finamore, supra note 115, at 34-35. 
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In addition to conserving fisheries resources, one of the main 
objectives of the FCMA is to give preference to U.S. fishermen 
operating within the 200-mile zone of the United States.122 This ob-
jective appears to have been accomplished, at least in part. In 197 4, 
foreign fishermen harvested 3.1 million metric tons of fish in U.S. 
waters. In 1977, however, subsequent to the passage of the FCMA, 
foreign fishermen harvested only 1.7 million metric tons.123 The 
number of foreign fishing vessels in this zone was reduced from 
2,700 per year to approximately 933.124 Additional enforcement 
measures taken by the U.S. Coast Guard and/or the use of remote-
sensing devices might further reduce the harvest by foreign 
fishermen. 125 
The U.S. fishing industry has generally increased in importance 
in international and domestic trade as a result of the FCMA.126 The 
value of fish caught from 3 to 200 miles off U.S. shores exceeds 
$1 billion per annum.127 The value of fish resources within the 
200-mile zone will continue to grow with the utilization of new 
technologies. For example, the United States is constructing pro-
cessing barges which will be placed within the fishing grounds. 
These barges will allow rapid processing of catches and will save 
fishermen the expense of taking their catches to shore-based 
facilities. Although the demand for fish in the United States far 
exceeds the available domestic supply, the U.S. industry is begin-
ning "to produce domestic equivalents for many of these imports."128 
The foreign demand for U.S. fish products has grown since passage 
of the FCMA, and exports have more than doubled since 1976.129 
In short, some available statistics indicate that the FCMA has en-
couraged growth in the U.S. commercial fisheries. 13° From a foreign 
policy perspective, however, the FCMA was a mistake because it 
hamstrung the U.S. negotiators at UNCLOS III and encouraged the 
rest of the international community to assert similar claims (a cost 
122. FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 171; Warner, supra note 8, at 98. 
123. FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 171-72. 
124. Id. at 174 (statement of James Walsh, Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration). 
125. See 200-MILE ZONE, supra note 110, at 38-47. 
126. Warner, supra note 8, at 98. 
127. Id.; FISHERIES 1982, supra note 4, at 11. 
128. Warner, supra note 8, at 98. 
129. Id.; FISHERIES 1982, supra note 4, at 49. 
130. Warner, supra note 8, at 98. 
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which will eventually outweigh the short-term economic benefits 
of the FCMA). 
The passage of the FCMA had far reaching implications for 
those nations dependent upon distant-water fishing, particularly 
J apan.131 Continued access to U.S. fishing grounds, especially the 
productive area off the coast of Alaska, was and is vital to Japan 
as a food source.132 In 1975, Japanese fishing boats caught approx-
imately 1.4 million metric tons of fish within the U.S. 200-mile zone.133 
The FCMA reduced the Japanese catch, and costs to each Japanese 
fisherman increased as fees were imposed on foreign vessels work-
ing American fishing grounds.134 Japan has warned that massive 
unemployment and political upheaval could result from the exten-
sion of "offshore jurisdiction to reduce Japan's fishing quotas in 
the North Pacific."135 
Despite the international impact of the FCMA, some studies 
indicate that the overall performance of the U.S. fishing industry 
subsequent to the passage of the FCMA has been disappointing.136 
The preferential access provided to U.S. fishermen under the FCMA 
did not produce a "substantial economic growth or a net increase 
in harvest over foreign fisherman." 137 In 1979, it was reported that 
the United States had a balance of payment deficit in fishery pro-
ducts in excess of $2.1 billion, and foreign fishermen were still 
harvesting between one-third and one-half of the fish taken in U.S. 
waters.138 Congress responded by enacting the American Fisheries 
Promotion Act of 1980 (AFPA),139 which amended the FCMA. The 
AFP A was designed to attract increased investment to the U.S. 
fishing industry and to increase the U.S. market share. The AFPA 
affects all foreign nations fishing within the U.S. 200-mile fishery 
131. Fishing Decline, supra note 95, at 56. 
132. Id. at 53. 
133. Id. at 56. 
134. Id. at 56-57. 
135. Id. at 96. 
136. Note, Fishery Conservation: Is The Categorical Exclusion Of Foreign Fleets The Next 
Step?, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 154, 176 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Exclusion Of Fleets]. 
137. Id. 
138. National Fishery Development Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979). 
139. Pub. L. No. 96-561, tit. II, pt. C, 94 Stat. 3287 (1980) (codified at scattered sections 
of 15, 16, 22, 43 & 46 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981)). Section 238 changes the official title of the 
FCMA to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) (codified at 
16 u.s.c. § 1801). 
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conservation zone by: (1) increasing the permit fees imposed on 
foreign fishermen;140 (2) requiring, with limited exceptions, the 
presence of a U.S. observer aboard each individual foreign fishing 
vessel within the 200-mile zone;141 (3) directing the Secretaries of 
State and Commerce to review the extent to which foreign coun-
tries restrict market access to U.S. fi~h products;142 (4) directing the 
Secretaries to consider the extent to which foreign countries 
cooperate with the enforcement of U.S. fishing regulations and the 
operation of the domestic fishing industry;143 and (5) establishing 
a mechanism which under certain circumstances would completely 
phase out foreign fishing within the 200-mile zone.144 
The primary criticism of the AFPA concerns the mandatory 
phase-out provision.145 Under a new method of calculation established 
in the AFP A, it is possible that even though there is a surplus of 
fish, foreign fishing can be phased out completely with regard to 
a particular fishery. 146 By precluding foreign fishermen from catch-
ing the available surplus of U.S. fish, this provision appears to 
violate the letter and spirit of article 62 of the LOS Convention.147 
Proponents of the AFP A claim that the phase-out provision is con-
sistent with the LOS Convention which permits a coastal state to 
protect and manage148 the living resources within this 200-mile 
zone.149 It is claimed that while the objectives of the LOS Conven-
tion are to create an "optimum utilization of the living resources"150 
and to "produce the maximum sustainable yield,"151 these goals are 
qualified by relevant economic factors. 152 "These qualifications 
demonstrate that there is no absolute right of foreign states to the 
surplus of fish in the 200-mile zones."153 Thus, the LOS Convention 
140. Id. § 232. 
141. Id. § 236. 
142. Id. § 231. 
143. Id. 
144. Id § 230; see Recent Development, Law Of The Sea: Protection Of Uni ted States 
Fishing Interests-American Fisheries Promotion Act of 1980, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 485, 485 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Fishing Interests]. 
145. Fishing Interests, supra note 144, at 488. 
146. Id. at 487-88. 
147. Id. at 488-89; see Burke, supra note 60, at 54. 
148. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 61. 
149. Fishing Interests, supra note 144, at 489. 
150. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 62, para. 1. 
151. Id. art 61, para. 3. 
152. Id.; Fishing Interests, supra note 144, at 489. 
153. Fishing Interests, supra note 144, at 489. 
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may permit the United States to temporarily preclude the 
harvesting of surplus fish in light of its economic interests.154 
It is at least "arguable that the 'optimum yield' approach of 
the FCMA, which made it less likely that foreign fishermen would 
be precluded from harvesting the United States surplus, better 
reflects prevailing views"155 under the LOS Convention than does 
the rigid formula of the AFP A. Nonetheless, Congress has con-
sidered legislation156 that would go one step further and require a 
total phase-out of foreign fishing. 157 In spite of the 1980 amendment 
to the FCMA, the United States has experienced only a slight in-
crease in its processed fish products since the passage of the 
FCMA.158 In 1982, the foreign fish catch (excluding tuna) within the 
U.S. 200-mile zone was 1.4 million metric tons, while the combined 
fish catch by U.S. and foreign vessels within the 200-mile zone was 
only 2.5 million metric tons.159 Despite these facts, the United States 
should proceed to provide for increased refinement and enforce-
ment of the FCMA.160 The categorical exclusion of foreign fishing 
fleets from the U.S. 200-mile zone, however, would violate interna-
tional law and would result in adverse foreign reactions.161 Although 
the United States may unilaterally terminate its reciprocal bilateral 
agreements, the United States could expect retaliation from other 
countries through similar phase-out programs which would 
adversely affect the U.S. fishing industry.162 
D. TRENDS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS 
Many scholars find the overwhelming acceptance of the 
200-mile economic zone disturbing. While the concept is supposed 
to preserve the preferential rights of the coastal states over coastal 
fisheries and to encourage rational management, the problems of 
such a system outweigh the benefits, and there are better ways 
of achieving these goals.163 
Although an open access system is generally considered 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 490. 
156. See H.R. 7039, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. III (1980). 
157. Exclusion Of Fleets, supra note 136, at 154. 
158. Id. at 178. 
159. FISHERIES 1982, supra note 4, at iv. 
160. Exclusion Of Fleets, supra note 136, at 203. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. See Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 176. 
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economically and biologically inefficient, management solely by na-
tional coastal zones has been deemed equally inadequate.164 As few 
species are contained within the coastal waters of a single coun-
try, the 200-mile zone concept is inadequate.165 The interests of 
neighboring countries sharing common fishery resources will con-
flict under a system of coastal state management, and in the case 
of highly migratory species, conflicts will remain between the coastal 
state and those nations fishing beyond the 200-mile zone.166 Even 
prior to the finalization of LOS Convention, national fisheries legisla-
tion demonstrated an awareness of the provisions in the earlier 
negotiating texts and a desire to comply with them.167 Consequent-
ly most legislation claims greater control over the 200-mile zone 
while at least providing for the possibility of foreign fishing. 168 The 
emphasis however, is on coastal state control over "access to 
surplus," not the obligation of the coastal state to permit access.169 
The trend toward this new ocean regime has been spurred by 
the quest of developing countries to obtain a degree of equaliza-
tion with other countries by asserting sovereignty over natural 
resources.170 Although some countries, such as Japan, initially 
resisted the 200-mile zone concept, they eventually recognized the 
need to acquiesce to the inevitability of this trend, the need to pro-
tect their own resources, and the opportunity to enhance their own 
bargaining position by establishing their own 200-mile zones.171 
The U.S. 200-mile zone is also increasing in importance because 
of the political leverage it provides. In 1980, the United States 
reacted to the U.S.S.R.'s invasion of Afghanistan by imposing 
economic sanctions. The United States announced that it would 
withhold sales of high technology equipment and grain and that the 
Soviet Union's fishing privileges within U.S. waters would be 
severely curtailed. Thus, the 200-mile zone concept provides an ad-
ditional opportunity to use the world's food resources as a political 
164. Prewo, supra note 1, at 265-66, 270. 
165. Id. at 270-71. 
166. Id. at 271. 
167. Moore, National Legislation for the Management of Pisheries Under Extended Coastal 
State Jurisdiction, 11 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 153, 176 (1980). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Kuribayashi, The New Ocean Regime and Japan, 11 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 95, 
113-14 (1982). 
171. Id. at 116; Fishing Decline, supra note 95, at 101-03; see Anand, The Politics of a 
New Legal Order for Fisheries, 11 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 265, 282 (1982). 
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weapon, although such action would appear to violate the LOS Con-
vention if no reallocation of the surplus is made. 
E. POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are two policy alternatives in the area of fisheries 
management and conservation, excluding the possibility of sur-
rendering all jurisdiction to the unilateral desires of coastal states. 
The first is the implementation of the common heritage principl_e 
on a global scale. The common heritage principle was an integral 
part of the UNCLOS III negotiations involving the deep sea-bed, 
but it can also be applied to living resources. 
Under this alternative, a global agency responsible for fisheries 
management and conservation would be established. The focus of 
such an agency would be on the efficient and equitable control of 
resources, and not on the spatial acquisition of territory .112 This 
global organization would provide technical service to each country 
and assist in the collection and collation of the voluminous biological 
and scientific data needed to meet management and conservation 
goals.173 The agency would gather the necessary knowledge about 
unexploited stocks which it could disseminate to developing coun-
tries. More importantly, the delegation of enforcement power to 
a central agency would promote uniformity and effectiveness of 
regulation.174 A successor organization to the IWC (specifically an 
International Cetacean Commission with expanded jurisdiction, 
perhaps including fisheries) would be a good initial organization for 
implementing the ASIL goals. 
The common heritage philosophy would have to be accepted 
by all coastal states before such a regime could function. Other-
wise, there would be no motivation for countries to surrender their 
present sovereignty to an international organization.175 Preferen-
tial treatment of coastal states and of those nations which are heavi-
ly dependent on foreign fisheries could be implemented through 
such a system.176 This alternative seeks a compromise between pure-
ly national control and control based on an equitable share of the 
living resources of the ocean. 
The second alternative is actually a variation of the common 
172. See Alverson, supra note 12, at 118. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 119. 
175. Regional A pproach, supra note 41, at 189. 
176. See id. at 189-90. 
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heritage philosophy. It involves regional implementation of the com-
mon heritage principle through shared economic zones.177 A regional 
approach offers the advantages of controlled resource utilization, 
while maintaining traditional high seas freedoms. Negotiation for 
access to distant fishery stocks is also simplified under such a plan. 
Negotiations are necessary only between the representatives of the 
few regional zones involved, rather than between representatives 
of the several individual countries.178 In addition, member states 
of a given regional zone would not need to negotiate to fish within 
the EEZ's of any of its regional neighbors, since the regional "um-
brella" pact would cover them all.179 
Intraregional political cooperation between developing coun-
tries in offshore fishery management might also extend to other 
arenas giving them a solidarity and power which they lack 
individually.180 Regional cooperation might also lead to large scale 
economic integration analogous to that of the European Common 
Market.181 Economic cooperation would allow developing nations to 
exploit more fully both the marine and land-based natural resources 
in their region.182 
The regional approach is probably more viable. The trend 
toward unilateral claims of complete sovereignty over coastal waters 
is blunted by regional arrangements. A coastal state would hesitate 
to risk losing the economic support of its regional neighbors to 
achieve total control over an area in which it already enjoyed 
beneficial control. In addition, the interests of both landlocked and 
coastal states could be met more effectively .183 
The regional approach requires coordination of legal claims be-
tween those nations participating in the regional agreement. It is 
consistent with, although not required by, the LOS Convention and 
has certain advantages. Individual nations may decide that there 
is greater security in protecting their shared regional interests, 
reducing the possibility of excessive territorial seas.184 A regional 
approach would also be easy to incorporate into the framework of 
177. Id. at 190. 
178. Id. at 192. 
179. Id. at 190-92; see Alexander, Regional Arrangements In The Oceans, 71 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 84, 101 (1977). 
180. Regional Approach, supra note 41, at 192-93. 
181. Id. at 193. 
182. Id. 
183. See id. at 193-94. 
184. Id. at 195. 
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the LOS Convention. The major shortfall of the proposal is that 
it does not effectively utilize the concept of the common heritage.185 
Equitable distribution of resources, stability of the regional zones, 
and effective conservation measures would probably not be fully 
accomplished.186 
This proposal for a regional authority would require the coun-
tries of a region to surrender at least part of their jurisdictional 
authority over their respective fishery zones to a regional body com-
parable to the world agency discussed earlier. Under such a regime, 
"a single off-shore area would be created and managed by the 
regional authority."187 
One large zone would be more likely to include a greater por-
tion of a fishery stock, thereby making any conservation measures 
more effective. The participation of landlocked states in the com-
bined zones would benefit the region through multinational inter-
action and regional solidarity.188 Special interests of countries in the 
region could easily be taken into account. Fishing quotas and specific 
allowances could be granted to landlocked states in exc·hange for 
economic considerations.189 
Both global and regional schemes have their strengths and 
weaknesses, but after balancing the equities, the better and more 
practical course of action involves implementation of the regional 
approach. Whether regional zones are established through ad hoc 
regional cooperation or through a regional authority is not critical. 
The impact of such a system could be lessened by first instituting 
regional cooperation and then, if the situation warrants, moving 
toward a regional authority. The problems involving the manage-
ment and conservation of fishery stocks are crucial and must be 
solved if the ocean is to continue providing for mankind. 
After the initial U.S. blunder of enacting the FCMA and 
thereby unilaterally extending U.S. fisheries jurisdiction to 200 
miles, the United States tried to mitigate the international impact 
of the FCMA by utilizing bilateral and regional fishery ar-
rangements, particularly bilateral "Agreements Concerning 
Fisheries off the Costs of the United States" which are popularly 
termed "Governing International Fishery Agreements" (GIFA's). 
185. Id. at 196. 
186. Id. at 195-96. 
187. Id. at 197-98. 
188. Id. at 198. 
189. Id. at 198-200. 
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While the FCMA, as modified by AFP A, constitutes the major 
U.S. legislation governing fisheries, other related U.S. legislation 
includes: 
a. the State Commercial Fisheries Research and Development 
Act of 1964,190 
b. the Anadromous Fish Conservation Act of 1965 (AFCA), 191 
c. the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 192 
d. the Salmon and Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement 
Act of 1980,193 
e. the Atlantic Salmon Convention Act of 1982,194 
f. the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA),195 
g. the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA),196 
h. the Estuarine Areas Act of 1968,197 
1. the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 1958 (FWCA),198 
and 
j. the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Con-
servation Act of 1980 (PNEPPCA).199 
The CZMA provides grants to states to develop and administer 
programs for managing resources and uses within their coastal 
areas. This program was supplemented and revised under the 
FCMA, which established the eight Regional Fishery Management 
Councils. 200 
Since the FWCA failed to adequately protect the fish and 
wildlife of the Columbia River Basin of the Pacific Northwest, Con-
gress enacted the PNEPPCA in 1980.201 The Columbia Basin sup-
plies about eighty percent of the area's electric energy needs while 
supporting the world's largest runs of steelhead trout and chinook 
190. 16 U.S.C. § 779 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
191. Id. § 757a (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
192. Id. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
193. Pub. L. No. 96-561, tit. I, 94 Stat. 3275 (1980) (codified at scattered sections of 16 
U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981)). 
194. 16 u.s.c. § 3601 (1982). 
195. Id. §§ 1451-64 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). 
196. Id. §§ 1361-1407 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
197. Id. §§ 1221-26 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
198. Id. §§ 661-668ee (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
199. Id §§ 839-839h (Supp. V 1981). 
200. See Smith, Management Of Living Resources, in MANAGING NATIONAL OCEAN 
RESOURCES 57, 58 (Center for Oceans Law & Policy, Jan. 1979). 
201. Blumm, Fulfilling The Parity Promise: A Perspective On Scientific Proof, Economic 
Cost, And Indian Treaty Rights In The Approval Of The Columbia Basin Fish And Wildlife 
Program, 13 ENVTL. L. 103, 156-57 (1982). 
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salmon.202 The two "in-stream" uses of the Columbia Basin, 
hydroelectric power generation and anadromous fish protection, 
have come into conflict203 causing a decline in anadromous fish runs. 
This Act "offers the promise of belatedly elevating fish and wildlife 
considerations to equal status with the other purposes for which 
Columbia Basin water projects are operated."204 Thus the PNEPPCA 
should serve to protect the coastal fisheries and to resurrect the 
Indian treaty right to have the fishing resources maintained free 
of manmade despoliation.205 
In the two years subsequent to enactment of the FCMA, U.S. 
harvests of fish stocks in the 200-mile zone were approximately 
700,000 metric tons per annum while the foreign catch in the same 
waters totalled 1.8 million metric tons; however, 1.9 million metric 
tons of the total catch of 2.5 million metric tons was taken within 
the U.S. three-mile limit.206 Therefore, these figures refute to some 
extent the exaggerated claims of numerous fish stocks between the 
three-mile and 200-mile limits. Such claims constituted a primary 
argument for enacting the FCMA. In any event, the U.S. annual 
catch contributes approximately $7 billion to the gross national pro-
duct of the United States.207 
In an attempt to fully utilize resources within the 200-mile zone, 
Congress proposed a bill which would have promoted the develop-
ment of an American fishing industry in certain underutilized 
species (AMFISH).208 It purported to further the objectives of the 
FCMA and defined an underutilized species as one for which a total 
allowable level of foreign fishing has been determined in accordance 
202. Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggl,e Of The Pacific Northwest's Anadromous 
Fish Resources For A Peaceful Coexistence With The Federal Columbia River Power System, 
11 ENVTL. L. 211, 212-13 (1981). 
203. Id. at 213. 
204. Blumm & Johnson, Promising A Process For Parity: The Pacific Northwest Elec-
tric Power Planning And Conservation Act And Anadromous Fish Protection, 11 ENVTL. L. 
497, 499 (1981). 
205. Id. at 533; see Note, United States v. Washington: Implied Treaty Rights To Con-
tinue Fishing, 18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659, 672 (1982). See generally Landau, Empty Victories: 
Indian Treaty Fishing Rights In The Pacific Northwest, 10 ENTVL. L. 413 (1980); Washington 
State 's Salmon And Steelhead Resources: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
206. Cong. Research Serv., Fisheries Development 2 (Issue Brief No. IB 79112, July 
15, 1980). 
207. Id. at 1. 
208. Underutilized Species Development Act of 1979, H.R. REP. No. 4360, 96th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1979). 
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with the FCMA, section 201(d).209 This bill met resistance because 
it was designed to permit foreign-built and foreign-flag fishing 
vessels to participate in the U.S. harvest, and this was viewed as 
counterproductive to the FCMA policy of phasing out foreign 
fishing.210 
Another plan suggested to help increase the yields of the U.S. 
fishing industry would require processors to draw vessels away 
from overcapitalized segments of the industry in order to dev~lop 
underutilized markets.211 In 1979, for example, the entire quota of 
king crab was harvested in just twenty-eight days. 212 The 
underutilized U.S. vessels could be used to develop the Alaskan 
ground fish harvest, which during the early 1980's was taken almost 
entirely by foreign nations.213 
Tax deferrals have also been proposed as a means of encourag-
ing growth within the U.S. fishing industry.214 Since harvesting 
capacity has exceeded the capabilities of processing facilities, it has 
been suggested that those tax deferral provisions which encourage 
the acquisition of additional vessels should be extended to provide 
similar incentives for the new construction of shoreside process-
ing facilities.215 
Private salmon ranching in the ocean has become another pro-
fitable development in the Pacific coast fishing industry. 216 Salmon 
are raised in hatcheries from the egg to the smolt stage.211 Then 
they are released from coastal facilities, and a small percentage of 
these salmon will return to spawn eighteen to fifty months later.218 
After ascending the fish ladders into the facilities from which they 
were released, they are harvested and processed for market.219 
209. Amfish: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and 
Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
1, 3 (1979). 
210. Id. at 1-2. 
211. Stokes & Offord, Alaska Groundfish: A Financial Feasibility Analysis, 9 OCEAN 
DEV. & INT'L L.J. 61, 75 (1981). 
212. Id. at 75-76. 
213. Id. at 62. 
214. Capital Construction Fund for Fishery Processing Facilities: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Merchant Marine of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1983). 
215. Id. 
216. Berg, Private Ocean Ranching Of Pacific Salmon And Fishery Management: A Prob-
lem Of Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 81, 81 (1981). 
217. Id. at 83. 
218. Id. at 83-84. 
219. Id. at 84. 
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Although the ecological implications of ocean ranching are not fully 
understood, it is fast becoming a significant fishery industry.220 
III. SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF THE SEA PROVISIONS 
The LOS Convention and the FCMA illustrate the problems 
of managing fish stocks through unilateral, coastal state competence. 
The meanings of the words "maximum sustainable yield," "optimum 
yield," and "full utilization" determine the degree to which the 
resources will be harvested and to whom they will be allocated. 
As a point of information, the language "optimum utilization" in 
the LOS Convention has replaced "optimum yield" in earlier drafts, 
but the concepts have remained similar. As indicated earlier, under 
the LOS Convention a coastal state has the right to determine the 
allowable catch of fish stocks within its economic zone as part of 
maintaining the maximum sustainable yield of those stocks and 
determining their optimum utilization.221 Article 61, paragraph 3, 
of the LOS Convention provides that a coastal state shall imple-
ment conservation and management measures "designed to main-
tain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can 
produce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant 
environmental and economic factors .... "222 A secondary require-
ment under article 62, paragraph 1, appears to obligate a coastal 
state to "promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living 
resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to ar-
ticle 61."223 Under these provisions, MSY appears to be a scientific 
determination made by the coastal state within certain parameters, 
while OY appears to be more of an obligation to allow other coun-
tries to harvest those stocks (up to the MSY) which the coastal state 
does not harvest.224 In this context, either the words "optimum 
utilization" should be stricken from article 64 governing highly 
migratory species, or more appropriately, "cetaceans" should be 
deleted from annex I and thus from the jurisdiction of article 64.225 
By contrast, the MSY and OY are mentioned neither in arti-
cle 66 governing anadromous species226 (which spawn in fresh water 
and spend most of their lives in salt water) nor in article 67 govern-
220. Id. at 130. 
221. Kronfol, supra note 15, at 464; see Burke, supra note 60, at 29. 
222. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 61, para. 3. 
223. Id. art. 62, para. 1. 
224. See id. arts. 61-62. 
225. Id. art. 64 & Annex I. 
226. LOS Convention, supra note 18, art. 66. 
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ing catadromous species (which spawn in salt water and spend most 
of their lives in fresh water).227 For anadromous stocks, the jurisdic-
tion of the coastal state in whose waters they spawn follows them 
wherever they swim.228 Catadromous species are under the jurisdic-
tion of the coastal state in whose waters they spend most of their 
life cycle.229 Sedentary species are not governed by this part of the 
LOS Convention.230 
A main problem in this area involves the way in which the con-
cepts of MSY and OY interface with the "full utilization" re-
quirements under the FCMA.231 In this context, Professor William 
Burke has highlighted the need for more precise definitions and 
scientific information.232 In interpreting the FCMA, there is little 
reason to concede that: 
MSY may only supplant OY if biological and other data are inade-
quate. Modification of MSY to OY, which can be more or less than 
MSY, is to be based on other relevant factors, remembering that 
optimum with respect to a fishery's yield means providing the 
greatest overall benefit to the Nation, especially in terms of food 
production. 
A council [i.e., one of eight councils established under the 
FCMA] may have perfectly adequate biological, economic, social, 
and ecological data, the political relevance of which impels its 
members to set an OY equal to MSY. Without some or all of these 
data, it is politic to adhere to MSY, which is generally understood, 
than to depart from this figure for a more speculative, less com-
prehensible OY. There may be no useful social and economic data 
with which to modify MSY. 
In real terms, OY must be defined by councils' actions. It may 
be defined as something other than a number in metric tons.233 
As the Fishery Management Plans (FMP's) being prepared by 
the FCMA regional councils are "primarily done by biologists, max-
imum sustainable yield, a biological concept, and not optimum yield 
as defined in the FCMA is the controlling factor in regulations pro-
227. Id. art. 67. 
228. Id. art. 66, para. 1. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. art. 68. 
231. FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 844-45 (statement of Langdon Warner, Science 
Associate, Environmental Defense Fund); see Burke, supra note 60, at 24-35. 
232. See Burke, supra note 60, at 24-35. 
233. FCMA Hearings, supra note 113, at 828, 830 (statement of Tom Reynolds, Executive 
Director, National Fish Meal and Oil Association). 
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mulgated by the Councils."234 In addition, there is "the lack of socio-
economic data available for inclusion into the FMP's resulting essen-
tially in MSY being renamed OY."235 Accordingly, definitions must 
be clarified, and the standards for preparing FMP' s must be made 
uniform.236 The Environmental Defense Fund has suggested that 
the definition of MSY under the FCMA be modified in part to mean 
"the largest [average] annual catch or yield in terms of weight of 
fish caught by both commercial and recreational fishermen that can 
be taken [continuously] from a stock without forcing it below a 
specified minimum population level and structure [under existing 
environmental conditions )."237 
Instead of debating definitions, a better approach to a solution 
might be to implement: 
a. a regionally coordinated, nationwide system for collecting 
marine recreational fishing statistics; 
b. ecological research, including stock assessment and com-
prehensive predator-prey studies; and 
c. the identification of social and economic data needs and 
priorities and development of cost effective methodoligies for col-
lecting these data.238 
This appears to be the best solution. In any event, this situation 
involving the FMP's and the FCMA needs to be resolved before 
adequate protection of U.S. fish stocks can be accomplished. Addi-
tionally, any final determinations should conform to the MSY and 
OY concepts formulated in articles 61 and 62 of the LOS 
Convention.239 
234. Id. at 902, 903 (statement of W.F. "Zeke" Grader, President, Western Region of 
the National Federation of Fishermen). 
235. Id. at 903. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 848, 865-66 (petition of the Environmental Defense Fund for the Amendment 
of the Guidelines for Development of Fishery Management Plans) (inserts and emphasis 
original). 
238. Id. at 992-94 (communication submitted by Ronald F. Labisky). 
239. See LOS Convention, supra note 18, arts. 61-62. 
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APPENDIX I 
1979 and 1980 Nominal Catches: By Species Groups 
(in metric tons) 
[Vol. 11:9 
FRESHWATER FISHES: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and countries 
1979 1980 
Carps, barbels and other cyprinids 597,404 616,167 
Tilapias and other cichlids 363,942 367,421 
Miscellaneous freshwater fishes 5,023,054 5,213,278 
DIADROMOUS FISHES: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and countries 
Sturgeons, paddlefishes, etc. 28,781 29,117 
River eels 85,197 91,636 
Salmons, trouts, smelts, etc. 750,718 770,276 
Shads, milkfishes, etc. 770,399 817,990 
Miscellaneous diadromous fishes 154,704 125,295 
MARINE FISHES: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and countries 
Flounders, halibuts, soles, etc. 1,145,559 1,084,367 
Cods, hakes, haddocks, etc. 10,608,533 10,719,675 
Redfishes, basses. congers, etc. 5,357,953 5,247,227 
Jacks, mullets, sauries, etc. 7,950,863 7,338,318 
Herrings, sardines, anchovies, etc. 15,719,039 16,225,200 
Tunas, bonitos, billfishes, etc. 2,384,854 2,489, 795 
Mackerels, snoeks, cutlassfishes, etc. 4,414,932 4,226,312 
Sharks, rays, chimaeras, etc. 579, 723 582,957 
Miscellaneous marine fishes 7,064,305 7,581,510 
CRUSTACEANS: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and countries. 
Freshwater crustaceans 91,433 
Sea-spiders, crabs, etc. 836,64 7 
Lobsters, spiny-rock lobsters etc. 111,483 
Squat-lobsters, nephrops, etc. 76,674 
Shrimps, prawns, etc. 1,560,507 
Krill, prawns, etc. 386,882 
Miscellaneous marine crustaceans 71,152 








Freshwater molluscs 255,180 266,588 
Abalones, winkles, conchs, etc. 72,460 86,595 
Oysters 873,060 972,885 
Mussels 582,298 613,965 
Scallops, pectens, etc. 398,522 364,173 
Clams, cockles, arkshells, etc. 1,053,494 1,176,771 
Squids, cuttlefishes, octopuses, etc. 1,558,814 1,572,098 
Miscellaneous marine molluscs 143,511 165,231 
WHALES, SEALS AND OTHER AQUATIC MAMMALS: Catches by species, major fishing areas 
and countries 
Blue-whales, fin-whales, etc. 
Sperm-whales, pilot-whales, etc. 
Porpoises, dolphins, etc. 
Eared seals, hair seals, walruses, etc. 
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MISCELLANEOUS AQUATIC ANIMALS: Nominal catches by species, major fishing areas and 
countries 
Frogs and other amphibians 1,088 695 
Turtles and other reptiles 7 ,377 6,248 
Sea-squirts and other tunicates 4,275 5,527 
Horseshoe crabs and other arachnoids 134 232 
Sea-urchins and other echinoderms 65,715 55,653 
Miscellaneous aquatic invertebrates 72,820 73,836 
MISCELLANEOUS AQUATIC ANIMAL PRODUCTS: Production by species, major fishing areas 
and countries 
Pearls, mother-of-pearl, shells, etc. 5,695 
Corals 126 
Sponges 104 
Aquatic bird guano, eggs, etc. 36,189 
AQUATIC PLANTS: Production by species, major fishing areas and countries 
Brown seaweeds 23,537,265 
Red seaweeds 771, 771 
Green seaweeds and other algae 3,403 
Miscellaneous aquatic plants 89,888 









Source: 50 U.N. FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, YEARBOOK OF FISHERY STATISTICS 43-45, 208-12, 
223-26 (1981). 
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APPENDIX II 








Regional Fisheries Advisory Commission for the Southwest Atlantic 
Fishery Commission for the Eastern Central Atlantic 
General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean 
Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission 
lndo-Pacific Fisheries Council 





















Baltic Sea Salmon Standing Committee 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna 
International Commission for the North-West Atlantic Fisheries 
International Commission for the South-East Atlantic Fisheries 
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission 
International Pacific Halibut Commission 
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission 
International Whaling Commission 
Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Fisheries Commission 
Japanese-Soviet Fisheries Commission for the North-West Pacific 
Mixed Commission of 1962 (Baltic Sea) 
Mixed Commission for Black Sea Fisheries 
North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission 
Permanent Commission of the Conference on the Use and Conservation of the 
Marine Resources of the South Pacific 
Sealing Commission for the North-East Atlantic 
Shellfish Commission for the Skagerak-Kattegat 










Committee for the Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in 
Asian Offshore Areas 
Co-operative Investigations of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions (now 
IOCARIBE) 
International Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean 
Sea 
Co-operative Investigations in the Mediterranean 
International Decade of Ocean Exploration 
International Geophysical Year 
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission 
IOC Association for the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions 
IOC Working Committee for Training, Education, and Mutual Assistance 
Source: See Alexander, Regional Arrangements In The Oceans, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 84, 101 (1977). 
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APPENDIX III 
Countries who are Signatories to Bilateral Agreements under the 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: Agreements 
Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States (GIF A's)* 
1. GIFA, U.S.-Bulgaria, Dec. 17, 1976, [1976-77] 4 U.S.T. 3955, T.l.A.S. No. 9045. 
45 
2. GIFA, U.S. Denmark, Sept. 5, 1979, [1979] 6 U.S.T. 4859, T.l.A.S. No. 9649 (effective Jan. 
18, 1980). 
3. GIFA, U.S.-European Economic Community, Feb.15, 1977, [1976-77] 4 U.S.T. 3787, T.l.A.S. 
No. 8598 (effective June 9, 1977). 
4. GIFA, U.S.-German Democratic Republic, Oct. 5, 1976, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1793, T.l.A.S. 
No. 8527 (effective Mar. 4, 1977). 
5. GIFA, U.S.-Japan, Sept. 10, 1982, T.l.A.S. No. 10480 (effective Jan. 1, 1983). 
6. GIFA, U.S.-Korea, Jan. 4, 1977, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1753, T.l.A.S. No. 8526 (effective Mar. 
3, 1977). 
7. GIFA, U.S.-Norway, Jan. 26, 1981, T.l.A.S. No. 10077 (effective May 15, 1981). 
8. GIFA, U.S.-Poland, Aug. 2, 1976, [1976-77] 2 U.S.T. 1681, T.l.A.S. No. 8524 (effective Feb. 
28, 1977). 
9. GIFA, U.S.-Portugal, Oct. 16, 1980, T.l.A.S. No. 9929 (effective Mar. 4, 1981). 
10. GIFA, U.S.-Spain, July 29, 1982, (effective Jan. 17, 1983). 
11. GIFA, U.S.-USSR, Nov. 26, 1976 [1976-77] 2 U.S.T.1847, T.l.A.S. No. 8528 (effective Feb. 
28, 1977). 
*GIF A is the general abbreviation for a bilateral treaty negotiated under the FCMA and 
properly entitled an "Agreement Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States." 
The GIFA's initials derived from the popular general term for such an agreement; namely, 
a "Governing International Fishery Agreement." As of the date this chart was prepared, 
several U.S.T. cites were not yet available. 
37
Kindt: The Law of the Sea: Anadromous and Catadromous Fish Stocks, Seden
Published by SURFACE, 1984
46 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 11:9 
APPENDIX IV 
Selected Major Agreements Related to Fisheries 
A. Multilateral Treaties to which the United States has Acceded as of 1983* 
1. Fisheries 
Convention on Fishings and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, 
done Apr. 29, 1958, [1966] 1U.S.T.138, T.l.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effec-
tive Mar. 20, 1966). 
Amended Agreement for the Establishment of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council, 
approved Nov. 23, 1961, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2511, T.I.A.S. No. 5218, 418 U.N.T.S. 348 
(effective Nov. 23, 1961). 
Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 
signed May 31, 1949, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 230, T.I.A.S. No. 2044, 80 U.N.T.S. 3 (effec-
tive Mar. 3, 1950). 
International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, 
signed May 9, 1952, [1953] 1 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65 (effec-
tive June 12, 1953). 
U.N. Special Fund Project on Caribbean Fishery Development, signed Apr. 6, 1966, 
[1968] 4 U.S.T. 4938, T.I.A.S. No. 6501 (effective Apr. 6, 1966). 
Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, done May 14, 1966, [1969] 3 U.S.T. 
2887, T.I.A.S. No. 6767, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 (effective Mar. 21, 1969). 
2. South Pacific Commission 
Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission, signed Feb. 6, 1947, [1951] 2 
U.S.T. 1787, T.l.A.S. No. 2317, 97 U.N.T.S. 227 (effective July 29, 1948). 
3. Whaling 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, concluded Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, 
T.S. No. 880, 3 Bevans 26, 155 U.N.T.S. 349 (effective Jan 16, 1935). 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling with Schedule of Whaling Regulations, 
signed Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.l.A.S. No. 1849, 4 Bevans 248, 161 U.N.T.S. 
72 (effective Nov. 10, 1948). 
Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling Signed Unde1 
Date of Dec. 2, 1946, done Nov. 19, 1956, [1959] 1 U.S.T. 952, T.l.A.S. No. 4228, 
338 U.N.T.S. 336 (effective May 4, 1959). 
B. Multilateral Treaties Not Involving the United States 
1952 Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, 205 U.N.T.S. 
65. 
London Fisheries Convention, Mar. 9, 1964, 581U.N.T.S.57, reprinted in U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG.SER.B/15, at 862 (1970). 
Draft Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Water-
front Habitat, done Feb. 3, 1971, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 969 (1972). 
*Those cites without U.N.T.S. references are caused by the slowness of the U.N. system 
in printing the U.N.T.S. 
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